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Variants of concern 
s u m m a r y 
Objectives: Recently emerging SARS-CoV-2 variants have been associated with an increased rate of trans- 
mission within the community. We sought to determine whether this also resulted in increased trans- 
mission within hospitals. 
Methods: We collected viral sequences and epidemiological data of patients with community and health- 
care associated SARS-CoV-2 infections, sampled from 16th November 2020 to 10th January 2021, from 
nine hospitals participating in the COG-UK HOCI study. Outbreaks were identified using ward informa- 
tion, lineage and pairwise genetic differences between viral sequences. 
Results: Mixed effects logistic regression analysis of 4184 sequences showed healthcare-acquired infec- 
tions were no more likely to be identified as the Alpha variant than community acquired infections. 
Nosocomial outbreaks were investigated based on overlapping ward stay and SARS-CoV-2 genome se- 
quence similarity. There was no significant difference in the number of patients involved in outbreaks 
caused by the Alpha variant compared to outbreaks caused by other lineages. 
Conclusions: We find no evidence to support it causing more nosocomial transmission than previous 
lineages. This suggests that the stringent infection prevention measures already in place in UK hospitals 
contained the spread of the Alpha variant as effectively as other less transmissible lineages, providing 
reassurance of their efficacy against emerging variants of concern. 
© 2021 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of The British Infection Association. 
This is an open access article under the CC BY license ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ) 
Introduction 
At least four severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 
(SARS-CoV-2) lineages which resulted in strain replacement have 
been documented in the UK. For two of these, the Alpha variant 
(lineage B.1.1.7), and the Delta variant (lineage B.1.617.2), increased 
spread has been associated with increased variant transmissibil- 
ity. The Alpha variant, which originated in the UK, was estimated 
to be up to 70% more transmissible than previously B.1 circulat- 
ing variants and by March 2021 accounted for over 86% of cases 
in the UK. 1–4 The more recently emerged Delta variant is thought 
to be 40-60% more transmissible than the Alpha variant, and as 
of June 2021 replaced the latter as the most dominant variant in 
the UK. 5 , 6 Both variants possess distinct mutations associated with 
increased transmissibility and antibody escape which might help 
explain their rise. 3 , 7–10 
All SARS CoV-2 variants are associated with nosocomial trans- 
mission. For example, during the March-April 2020 peak of the 
COVID-19 outbreak it was estimated that up to 15% of inpatient 
cases were acquired in a healthcare setting. 11–14 With the recogni- 
tion of highly transmissible variants, consideration has been given 
as to whether more stringent control measures would be needed 
to prevent increased spread in healthcare settings. 15 , 16 
This study aimed to determine if the reported increased com- 
munity transmissibility of the Alpha variant is replicated in hospi- 
tals. To address this, we identified nosocomial outbreaks using data 
from the COVID-19 Genomics UK Consortium (COG-UK) Hospital 
Onset COVID-19 Infection (HOCI) study, which collected epidemi- 
ological information and viral sequences from healthcare/hospital 
acquired COVID-19 infections during the winter of 2020-21. 
Methods 
Sequence and patient meta-data 
Data were collected as part of the COG-UK HOCI variant sub- 
study from nine NHS hospitals across the UK, six of which were 
within London. The first SARS-CoV-2 positive sample from all in- 
patients, outpatient, A&E patients and healthcare workers (HCW), 
tested by hospital laboratories between 16th November 2020 and 
10th January 2021, were sequenced. In addition metadata were col- 
lected on patient age, sex (f/m/other/unknown), date of hospital 
admission and ward location. Ethical approval for the HOCI study 
was provided by REC 20/EE/0118. Additional clinical details and co- 
morbidities for this dataset are available elsewhere. 17 
Inpatients were classified into 3 groups: (i) patients admitted 
with SARS-CoV-2 (community-acquired infections, CAIs), (ii) those 
without symptoms of COVID 19 on admission, testing negative 
upon admission but testing positive between 3-7 days following 
admission (indeterminate healthcare-associated infections, HCAIs) 
and (iii) those without symptoms of COVID-19 on admission with a 
positive test > = 8 days post-admission (probable/definite HCAIs). 18 
Sequence data were also available for patients who presented to 
hospital but were not admitted, hospital outpatients and health- 
care workers. The non-inpatients groups are included in the evalu- 
ation of Alpha variant prevalence only. 
SARS-CoV-2 sequencing 
Samples were sequenced by Oxford Nanopore Technologies 
(ONT)-based or Illumina-based methods as part of the COG-UK 
consortium. 19 To maximise success 3 of 9 labs sequenced only 
those samples with qPCR cycle thresholds (Ct) values of ≤32 
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or equivalent, corresponding to 54% of samples (2268/4184). Se- 
quences were assigned to lineages using COG-UK Pangolin (date 
2021-04-14). 20 The GISAID and/or ENA accession number of 3589 
sequences which are publicly available are in supplementary Table 
1. 
Prevalence in community testing (Pillar 2) from COG-UK 
The number of samples in the COG-UK dataset collected be- 
tween 16th November 2020 and 10th January 2021 from commu- 
nity areas, local to participating hospitals (i.e. shared adm2 desig- 
nation), was tallied by week. 21 
Statistical analysis 
Differences between patient groups in the prevalence of the Al- 
pha variant among positive samples were evaluated using mixed 
effects logistic regression. 22 CAI or HCAI, sex, age and sample week 
were included as predictive variables. Parameters for sample weeks 
were fitted separately for London sites compared with other sites 
grouped, and random intercept terms were included for each hos- 
pital and for weekly periods nested within hospitals. This analysis 
was also repeated including only the London sites. 
Outbreak analyses were conducted using sequences with 
greater than 90% coverage across the SARS-CoV-2 genome (1043 
sequences). Sequence diversity was measured by pairwise distance, 
defined as the number of single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) 
differences between two sequences (excluding Ns), calculated in 
the R ‘ape‘ package. 23 The summary results were then grouped by 
lineage. To determine whether sequences were part of a nosoco- 
mial outbreak, we only focused on probable/definite HCAIs diag- 
nosed ≥8 days post-admission. Cases occurring on the same wards 
(excluding known COVID-19 wards), with a pairwise distance of 0 
(i.e. identical sequences) and within a time window of  7 days 
were considered linked and part of the same outbreak. We also 
included, as independent outbreaks, all samples not linked to any 
other (i.e. one unlinked sample irrespective of time and location 
will count as an outbreak of size 1). As these patients all acquired 
the infection in hospital, they are likely to represent nosocomial 
transmission (for example from other patients or HCWs whose 
virus was not sequenced or did not achieve adequate coverage). 
All analyses were conducted in R version 4.0.2, using tidy- 
verse collection of packages and other statistical packages such as 




Between November 16th 2020 and January 10th 2021 SARS- 
CoV-2 RNA positive upper respiratory tract samples from 4184 sub- 
jects were successfully sequenced, including 2455 inpatients, 450 
outpatients, 1166 HCWs and 113 (4.4 %) with unknown status. Of 
the inpatients, 16 6 6 (64.9 %) were hospitalised with community- 
acquired infection, 215 (8.4 %) with indeterminate HCAI and 574 
(22.4 %) with probable/definite HCAI, ( Table 1 ). In total, 2058 sam- 
ples were the Alpha variant, 4 samples were the Beta variant (lin- 
eage B.1.351) and 2122 were of lineages not designated variants of 
concern.The two most prominent lineages across the dataset were 
B.1.1.7 (the Alpha variant) and B.1.177. This was also true when re- 
stricting to HCAI samples alone (Supplementary Fig. 1). 
Data from laboratories not using Ct or equivalent thresholds 
confirmed that the proportions of the Alpha variant and non-Alpha 
variant viruses did not differ in samples with Ct values < = 32 (Sup- 
plementary Fig. 2, Chi-square test p = 0.16). 
Prevalence of the Alpha variant 
The prevalence of the Alpha variant was highest in London and 
Hampshire (South of England), but substantially increased at all 
sites over the study period ( Fig. 1 ). On mixed effects logistic re- 
gression analysis of the Alpha variant, using 4165 samples with 
complete metadata, samples from HCWs (OR 0.78, 95 CI% 0.60 to 
1.01), indeterminate HCAIs (OR 0.45, 95 CI% 0.30 to 0.70) or prob- 
able/definite HCAI (0.45, 0.34 to 0.59) were less likely to be identi- 
fied as the Alpha variant compared to CAIs than non-Alpha variant. 
Suggesting that the proportion of hospital-acquired infections due 
to the Alpha variant was lower in any given week than the propor- 
tion among those presenting to hospital with community-acquired 
infection. However, changes in the frequency of the Alpha variant 
in CAIs correlated with those in HCAIs on a regional basis (Pear- 
son’s correlation coefficient in London 0.90, 95% CI: 0.54-0.98, p- 
value < 0.01, outside London 0.88, 95% CI 0.45-0.98, p-value < 0.05) 
(Supplementary Fig. 3a). This relationship was confirmed also be- 
tween HCAIs and community data from the general population 
(Pillar2, Supplementary Fig. 3b). Following the rapid growth of the 
Alpha variant within the community and hospitals, we observed 
a decrease of other lineages. In particular, B.1.177, which was the 
dominant strain in Europe before November 2020, 27 , 28 showed a 
correlation between CAIs and HCAIs (overall correlation 0.85) and 
an opposite trend to the Alpha variant with frequencies decreasing 
overtime (Supplementary Fig. 4). 
Pairwise distance in HCAI 
To help define outbreaks within hospitals, we used the se- 
quence diversity within outbreaks involving patients with defined 
probable/definite HCAIs. We first compared the genetic distance 
among the Alpha variant sequences and separately among non- 
Alpha variant sequences of the same lineage. We found the mean 
pairwise distance (measured as number of SNPs difference) was 
lower between the Alpha variant samples than between sam- 
ples from other lineages (mean = 6.75 SNPs (95% CI 6.74-6.78) 
vs mean = 8.01 SNPs (95% CI 7.95–8.07), Mann-Whitney U test p 
< 0.05, Supplementary Fig. 5). We next considered only viruses 
from patients who had very likely acquired their infection in hos- 
pital (i.e. probable/definite HCAIs). Excluding wards that were used 
for cohorting COVID-19 patients, the mean pairwise distance be- 
tween sequences from patients on the same ward was higher 
for the Alpha variant acquired in hospital than for non-Alpha 
(mean = 1.95 SNPs (95% CI 1.64–2.27) vs mean = 0.71 SNPS (95% 
CI 0.635-0.78), Mann-Whitney U test p < 0.05). However, for both 
the Alpha variant and non-Alpha variants the pairwise distance be- 
tween samples in the same ward was low. 
Outbreaks 
Given the low diversity observed within wards, and in agree- 
ment with previous studies, 14 a stringent definition was applied to 
define linked infections. Samples were considered linked, and part 
of the same outbreak, when the the sequences were completely 
identical and occurred on the same ward within a period of 7 days. 
Outbreaks of size one, corresponding to samples not linked to any 
other sample, were allowed. The 7 day threshold is consistent with 
evidence that most people become symptomatic 7 days after expo- 
sure. 29 , 30 This choice was also inline with previous transmission 
studies. 16 The impact of allowing for multi-ward outbreaks and 
varying the time period and the pairwise SNP differences defining 
an outbreak was tested in a sensitivity analysis. 
Ward data was available for a total of 497 probable/definite 
HCAI patients. A total of 83 outbreaks were identified (by the 
above definition) caused by any lineage across all hospitals, 19 of 
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Table 1 
Proportion of SARS-CoV-2 due to the Alpha variant for all sequenced samples. 
Alpha variant (n = 2058) Non-Alpha variant (n = 2126) Total (n = 4184) 
Age [mean (sd)] 
53.4 (21.8) 58 (22.6) 55.7 (22.3) 
Missing 0 1 1 
Sex 
Female 1109 (48.6) 1175 (51.4) 2,284 (100.0) 
Male 938 (49.8) 944 (50.2) 1,882 (100.0) 
Missing 11 7 18 
Week starting: 
16/11/2020 22 (8.5) 238 (91.5) 260 (100.0) 
23/11/2020 50 (15.0) 284 (85.0) 334 (100.0) 
30/11/2020 83 (20.4) 324 (79.6) 407 (100.0) 
07/12/2020 128 (30.0) 299 (70.0) 427 (100.0) 
14/12/2020 312 (45.7) 370 (54.3) 682 (100.0) 
21/12/2020 411 (57.2) 307 (42.8) 718 (100.0) 
28/12/2020 648 (75.2) 214 (24.8) 862 (100.0) 
04/01/2021 404 (81.8) 90 (18.2) 494 (100.0) 
Patient Class 
Outpatients 250 (55.6) 200 (44.4) 450 (100.0) 
Any HCW 559 (47.9) 607 (52.1) 1,166 (100.0) 
Inpatients 1182 (48.1) 1273 (51.9) 2,455 (100.0) 
CAI ∗ 926 (55.6) 740 (44.4) 1,666 (100.0) 
Indeterminate HCAI † 56 (26.0) 159 (74.0) 215 (100.0) 
Probable/definite HCAI ‡ 200 (34.8) 374 (65.2) 574 (100.0) 
Unknown category 67 (59.3) 46 (40.7) 113 (100.0) 
Region 
Glasgow 91 (31.6) 197 (68.4) 288 (100.0) 
Hampshire 288 (66.2) 147 (33.8) 435 (100.0) 
London 1480 (65.6) 775 (34.4) 2,255 (100.0) 
South Yorkshire 199 (16.5) 1007 (83.5) 1,206 (100.0) 
∗ Diagnosed at or ≤2 days from admission. 
† Diagnosed 3-7 days from admission. 
‡ Diagnosed ≥8 days from admission. CAI, community-acquired infection; HCAI, healthcare-associated 
infection; HCW, healthcare worker. 
which were caused by the Alpha variant. Outbreaks caused by the 
Alpha variant in hospitals increased with time, associated with the 
changing prevalence of the Alpha variant within the community 
( Fig. 2 ). In contrast outbreaks due to other lineages decreased in 
line with reduced circulation of those lineages in the community. 
Whilst this trend is observed both within and outside London, the 
dominance of the Alpha variant outbreaks occurs earlier within 
London, reflecting the earlier rise in the community. 
The sizes of outbreak clusters within hospitals caused by the Al- 
pha variant and by other lineages were compared. The total num- 
ber of probable/definite HCAI patients in a single outbreak ranged 
from 1 to 11. There was no significant difference in the num- 
ber of patients involved in outbreaks caused by the Alpha variant 
compared to outbreaks caused by other lineages (global Kruskal- 
Wallis p-value = 0.27, pairwise comparisons non-significant, Fig. 3 ). 
The mean size for the Alpha variant outbreaks was 2.22 in London 
(95% CI 1.22–3.22) and 3.30 in other locations (95% CI 1.39–5.21). 
Outbreaks of non-B.1.1.7 lineages had a mean size of 3.72 and 2.78 
in London and outside respectively (95% CI 2.32–5.13 in London 
and 95% CI 2.08–3.49 outside). These conclusions were unchanged, 
by the sensitivity analyses (Supplementary Fig. 6). 
Discussion 
Nosocomial transmission continues to present a major chal- 
lenge to the control of SARS-CoV-2 infection. Overall SARS-CoV-2 
acquired in hospitals is estimated to have accounted for up to 20% 
COVID-19 inpatient cases during the first wave. 31 Recent data from 
Scotland suggest that up to 36% of severe COVID-19 is associated 
with recent exposure in hospital (from 1 March 2020 to 28 Jan- 
uary 2021). 32 This is in line with the proportions identified in our 
data, with 22.4% of inpatients having probable/definite HCAI and 
8.4% having indeterminate HCAI across all sites. The emergence 
of new variants with evidence of greater transmissibility in the 
community presents a potentially increased threat of nosocomial 
transmission leading to calls for better protection for staff and pa- 
tients. 15 
Using detailed metadata on community and healthcare- 
acquired infections from 2455 inpatients in 9 hospitals across the 
UK linked to genomic data sequenced during the winter of 20/21 
as part of COG-UK HOCI study, logistic regression analysis showed 
that having a healthcare-acquired infection was predictive of non- 
Alpha variants. This implies that the Alpha variant was not spread- 
ing faster within hospitals than in the community ( Table 2 ). This 
finding was despite a rise in numbers of COVID-19 cases among 
both inpatients and the community, with an increasing proportion 
caused by the Alpha variant ( Fig. 1 ). As has been previously re- 
ported, the total numbers of HCAIs were closely correlated with 
the rising numbers of cases in the community and the increase in 
HCAI infections caused by the Alpha variant also correlated with 
increasing prevalence of the Alpha variant overall. 29 
We made use of the genomic data and detailed information on 
hospital acquired infections to better identify and quantify linked 
hospital infections. The definition of an outbreak was considered 
carefully. Previous outbreak data suggest that the mutation rate of 
SARS-CoV-2 is low, with an average of less than one fixed mutation 
occurring for each transmission. 33 Nonetheless, up to 2 single nu- 
cleotide differences have been described in viruses that are known 
to be part of a single nosocomial outbreak. 34 In our data, we noted 
very little genetic diversity across the Alpha variant (Supplemen- 
tary Fig. 5), reflecting the rapid expansion and selective sweep that 
occurred as the variant rapidly spread. We therefore chose a strin- 
gent definition of linked infections, requiring identical sequences 
and included only patients with a high likelihood of having ac- 
quired their infection in hospital (i.e. probable or definite hospital 
onset SARS-CoV-2 infection). We also restricted putatively linked 
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Fig. 1. Prevalence over time of the Alpha variant in hospitalized patients, healthcare workers (HCWs) and community samples (Pillar 2 data as described in methods) from 
different geographical regions in the UK. Hospitalized patients are displayed according to community-acquired infection (CAI) (diagnosed at or ≤2 days from admission) or 
healthcare-associated infection (HCAI) (diagnosed ≥3 days from admission). 
Fig. 2. Barplot showing number of HOCI patients involved in outbreaks by week and location, coloured by variant (Alpha vs non-Alpha). Line-chart represents the number of 
CAI (community-acquired infections, including inpatients, outpatient, A&E patients and healthcare workers) overtime coloured by variant (Alpha variant presence/absence). 
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Fig. 3. Violin plot showing the size of outbreaks in hospital-onset COVID-19 infection patients for four categories: outbreaks caused by the Alpha variant in London and 
other locations and outbreaks caused by other lineages in London and outside London. Colour represents lineages: in lighter grey the Alpha variant and in black non-Alpha 
variant. Non-parametric global Kruskal-Wallis p-value = 0.27, pairwise comparisons (Mann-Whitney) non-significant. The number below each violin shows the number of 
clusters/outbreaks for that category. 
Table 2 
Multivariable mixed effects logistic regression for prediction of being infected with the Alpha variant among positive 
samples sequenced by hospital labs. 
All samples London sites only 
OR (95% CI) p-value OR (95% CI) p-value 
Age 0.03 0.09 
0.99(0.99–1.00) 1.00(0.99–1.00) 
Sex 0.51 0.43 
Female Reference Reference 
Male 0.95(0.80–1.12) 0.92(0.74–1.14) 
Patient class < 0.001 < 0.001 
Inpatient (CAI) † Reference Reference 
A&E attendee 1.35(0.87–2.09) 1.25 (0.76–2.05) 
Outpatient 0.86(0.58–1.26) 0.78 (0.47–1.32) 
Any HCW 0.78(0.60–1.01) 0.67 (0.48–0.93) 
Indeterminate HCAI ‡ 0.45(0.30–0.70) 0.33 (0.19–0.58) 
Probable/definite HCAI ‡ 0.45(0.34–0.59) 0.29 (0.20–0.41) 
Unknown 2.46(1.41–4.30) 3.19 (1.28–7.92) 
Week starting: Mean Prop. London# Mean Prop. Elsewhere# Mean Prop.# 
16/11/2020 0.14(0.09–0.21) 0.02(0–0.07) 0.08(0.06–0.13) 
23/11/2020 0.23(0.17–0.30) 0.03(0.01–0.08) 0.15(0.11–0.19) 
30/11/2020 0.36(0.30–0.44) 0.05(0.03–0.09) 0.20(0.17–0.25) 
07/12/2020 0.50(0.43–0.57) 0.10(0.07–0.15) 0.30(0.26–0.35) 
14/12/2020 0.76(0.67–0.81) 0.18(0.14–0.22) 0.46(0.42–0.50) 
21/12/2020 0.77(0.72–0.81) 0.30(0.25–0.36) 0.57(0.53–0.60) 
28/12/2020 0.86(0.83–0.89) 0.60(0.55–0.65) 0.75(0.72–0.78) 
04/01/2021 0.88(0.84–0.92) 0.74(0.67–0.79) 0.82(0.78–0.84) 
† Diagnosed at or ≤2 days from admission. 
‡ Diagnosed 3-7 days from admission. Diagnosed ≥8 days from admission. # Estimate of proportion infected with 
the Alpha variant from model for a 55-year-old male inpatient admitted with COVID-19. CAI, community-acquired 
infection; HCAI, healthcare-associated infection; HCW, healthcare worker; OR, odds ratio. 
cases to those on the same ward and within a time window of 
7 days to further increase the specificity of outbreak definition. 
Within these constraints, the genomic data failed to identify a dif- 
ference between the size of outbreaks occurring on wards between 
the Alpha variant and previously circulating lineages. 
However, the outbreak definition implemented in our primary 
analysis is rather stringent. First, as we lack complete records of 
patients movement, we potentially exclude linked cases in differ- 
ent wards, for example patients who were infected by the same 
health-care worker or patients who moved before/after diagnosis. 
Second, our choice of a 7 days window is rather conservative, con- 
sidering that estimates of the incubation period vary with some 
outbreak studies opting for a larger period of 14 days. 29 Third, us- 
ing only identical sequences we could bias against lineages with 
smaller diversity. To assess the impact of our parameters’ choice 
and the robustness of our results, we carried out a sensitivity anal- 
ysis varying our parameters to link cases. Allowing for multi-ward 
outbreaks, increasing the numbers of SNP differences to two and 
varying the time interval for defining linked cases (0, 7 and 14 
days) failed to change the findings. 
There are a number of limitations to our work. First, we were 
not able to sequence all positive cases. Five of nine centres only 
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sequenced samples with PCR cycle thresholds of 32 and below 
i.e. higher viral loads. Notably though, sequencing of 694 cases, 
from three labs not using Ct thresholds with available Ct data, did 
not find any difference in the distribution of genotypes in sam- 
ples with Ct values below and above 32 (supplementary Fig. 1). 
A second limitation of our work is that towards the end of the 
study all three trusts outside London were using a sequence re- 
porting tool (SRT), as part of the HOCI study, 33 rather than phylo- 
genetic analysis alone to help determine whether cases were part 
of linked outbreaks. It is not known whether the SRT may have 
limited the extent of outbreaks as data processing and analysis for 
the HOCI study is still ongoing. Finally, this study was not designed 
to account for use of personal protective equipment (PPE), aerosol 
generating procedures (AGP) or ventilation which may also impact 
transmission. 
In summary notwithstanding its greater transmissibility in the 
community, we find no evidence to support the Alpha variant as 
having caused more nosocomial transmission than previous vari- 
ants. This suggests that the stringent infection prevention mea- 
sures already in place in UK hospitals are similarly effective at 
containing the spread of SARS-CoV-2 in a healthcare setting irre- 
spective of its transmissibility. This finding implies that ongoing 
nosocomial spread of SARS-CoV-2 is likely to be influenced by fac- 
tors such as fixed estate, e.g. building infrastructure, beds in bays, 
shared facilities and ventilation, which are not readily mitigated by 
the existing infection prevention and control (IPC) measures. How- 
ever, there is some reassurance that currently implemented IPC 
measures are likely to be as effective against more transmissible 
variants. 
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